What is the judgment? For a long time, the judgment was placed in the sphere of belief, and it has not been considered an activity separated from the passions. The great conceptual operation of modernity has been that to distinguish the judgment from other faculties of the mind, making it pure. But is it so? May the judgment affect the attribution of value, what it is good and what is bad, or is it a ‘krinein’ (Die Kritik), a cognitive tool aimed to discern? The legal realm implies an extraordinary imagination because you try to see the subjects in future scenarios. To determine whether the judgment, the central exercise of legal, is the result of passion, belief or action is pure not only changes the system of the law but also what we expect from it. Also, it affects our ability to recognize the action of legal on our lives. My point concerns, in fact, just this problem and that I wonder if it is legal or not prominent in our lives through various forms of judgment. Many authors argue that the economy has taken the place of the law and directs life because it is substantially the same shape of the life. I do not think so (I often use the verb to believe … I don’t believe…because everything is a belief, and you tend to ‘choose’ the belief that it is more strategic to the desires you have).
According to Foucault (1982), “The relationship proper to power would not, therefore, be sought on the side of violence or of struggle, nor on that of voluntary linking (…), but rather in the area of the singular mode of action, neither warlike nor juridical, which is government”. In criticizing the juridical model, Foucault saw the central mode of power not in law and consensus but government (1997). Foucault named ‘biopower’ the shift in the rationality of government which affects subjectivation beyond the frame of juridico-discursive representation (Foucault 1990). In claiming that the strategic conception should provide the “exact opposite” of the juridical model, Foucault accepted the juridical model by simply negating it (Lemke, 2000).
Is the juridico-discursive representation no more related to the subjectivation? And “How is it possible that this headless social governmentalized body often behaves as if it indeed had a head?” (Dean 1994) In fact, many social phenomena seem to reveal oriented trends. I propose that homo juridicus plays a role in subjectivation by orienting the social govermentalized body via judgmental discourses you have in social networks.
In my last works, I develop this topic. Plus, I am writing a paper on FB and the judgment. I hope that this issue can be interesting for OfficinaSedici’s readers!